present separated us. His Government would not expect us to do anything unreasonable or to make a complete reversal in our policy, but rather to adopt a more realist attitude in the face of the present crisis.
6. In the course of subsequent conversation with the Parliamentary Under- Secretary, the Ambassador enquired whether we had replied to the Japanese aide-mémoire on the subject of the removal of our troops. On being told that an interim reply had been sent, the Ambassador said that he regretted that the new Government had broached this matter so suddenly and, as he felt, so awkwardly. The truth was that the Japanese Government had fear of incidents of which they had had wind. They feared that a clash might take place between two armed forces which, in the present state of international relations, it would be impossible to localise. When asked whether he thought there was an immediate risk of incidents, the Ambassador said that no decision could be taken about the withdrawal of troops in a hurry or, apparently, under pressure. however, that this matter would be approached, following up my offer of a further He hoped, discussion upon general issues of policy; and that in the interests of peace in the Far East the time would come when we could honourably withdraw some troops, because of their being needed elsewhere, and could at the same time feel sufficient confidence in the Japanese Government to accept their offer to look after British interests in the event of such withdrawal taking place.
I am, &c.
HALIFAX,
3
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